



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS GROUP THREE
NAVAL STATION BOX 368201
3985 CUMMINGS ROAD, SUITE 4
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92136-5289

COMPHIBGRUTHREEINST 3401.1 CH1
N5

25 JUN 01

COMPHIBGRU THREE INSTRUCTION 3401.1 CHANGE TRANSMITTAL 1

From: Commander, Amphibious Group THREE
To: Distribution

Subj: MARITIME PREPOSITIONING FORCE (MPF) OPERATIONS IN A
CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, AND RADIOLOGICAL (CBR) ENVIRONMENT

1. Purpose. To update individual Protective Equipment (IPE) list.
2. Action. Make appropriate pen and ink change to enclosure (7), paragraph (2), sub-paragraph (b) to read as follows: Three joint service lightweight suits (JSLIST), to include three sets of protective overboots and gloves and one replacement hood.

K. K. McNeess
K. K. MCNEES
Chief of Staff
Acting

DiStribution:
CINCPACFLT
COMSEVENTHFLT
COMUSFORKOREA
COMTHIRDFLT
COMUSNAVCENT/COMFIFTHFLT
COMPHIBGRU ONE
CG I MEF
CG III MEF
COMNAVBEACHGRU ONE
COMPSRON ONE
COMPSRON TWO
COMPSRON THREE
COMNCWGRU ONE
PHIBCB ONE
ACU ONE
BMU ONE
NAVCHAPGRU



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MAR 03 2000

COMPHIBGRU THREE INSTRUCTION 3401.1

Subj: MARITIME PREPOSITIONING FORCE (MPF) OPERATIONS IN A
CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, AND RADIOLOGICAL (CBR)
ENVIRONMENT

Ref: (a) Joint Pub 3-10.1; Joint Tactics Techniques and
Procedures (JTTP) for Base Defense
(b) Joint Pub 3-11; Joint Doctrine for Nuclear,
Biological and Chemical (NBC) Defense
(c) APPENDIX 10 TO ANNEX C TO USCINCCENT OPOD 97-10A;
NBC Defense
(d) USCINCCENT CONPLAN 1205; Consequence Management
(e) COMUSNAVCENT OPTASK CHEM-BIO Defense
(f) DA FM 3-14/MCRP 3-37.1A; Nuclear, Biological, and
Chemical (NBC) Vulnerability Analysis
(g) NAVFACINST 3440.17B; Chemical, Biological, and
Radiological Warfare Defense (CBR-D) Material and
Equipment Allowance for Naval Shore Activities
(h) NAVSEA 077; Personnel Protective Equipment
(i) DA FM 3-4; Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC)
Protection
(j) DA FM 3-4-1; Multi-service procedures for Nuclear,
Biological, and Chemical (NBC) defense of fixed
sites, ports, and airfields.

Encl: (1) CMPF CBR-D Organization
(2) CBR-D Intelligence Report
(3) CBR-D Equipment Resupply/Sustainment Plan
(4) CBR-D Training Requirements
(5) Emergency Response Team (ERT)
(6) Chemical Personnel Decontamination Control Area and
CCA
(7) Standard CBR-D Equipment List
(8) CBR-D Medication Distribution Plan
(9) Decontamination Priority List
(10) Ready Shelter Station (Collective Protective Shelter
(CPS))
(11) Chemical Agent Employment (Nonpersistent) Weather
Factors
(12) Chemical Agent Employment (Persistent) Weather
Factors

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- (13) Common Industrial Hazards
- (14) Biological Agent Employment Weather Factors
- (15) Possible Militarily Significant Biological Agents, Bacteria
- (16) Biological Effects of Nuclear Radiation
- (17) Chemical Attack Risk Checklist
- (18) Biological Attack Risk Checklist
- (19) Nuclear Attack Risk Checklist
- (20) Mission Orientated Protective Posture Levels (MOPP) Levels/NBC Response Measures
- (21) Equipment Electromagnetic Pulse Vulnerabilities
- (22) Required Reports
- (23) Alarm Notification System

1. Purpose. To promulgate Commander, Amphibious Group THREE's guidance in preparing defensive measures prior to a Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) attack and defining procedures to be used in minimizing personnel casualties and equipment damage during MPF operations in a CBR environment in U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) and U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) area of responsibility (AOR)s.

2. Scope. Above enclosures provide CBR defensive (CBR-D) preparations and force protection procedures against an enemy with the capability and intent to use Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) to disrupt MPF operations in USCENTCOM and USPACOM AOR.

3. Background. As directed, Commander, Amphibious Group THREE and its subordinate elements deploy to USCENTCOM and USPACOM in support of standing Operational Plans (OPLANS) and Contingency Plans (CONPLANS) to conduct MPF operations by offloading equipment and supplies from Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadron (MPSRON) ONE, TWO, and THREE to enable activation of Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) from I and III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). The critical nature of this operation requires all units assigned to Commander, Maritime Prepositioning Force (CMPF) be trained and equipped to conduct MPF operations in a CBR-D environment. Enemy forces, terrorists, or warring factions may employ a variety of CBR weapons in future conflicts and/or as an act of terrorism. The possible combinations of agents and delivery systems place civilians and US military involved in MPF operations at risk. An incident or attack involving WMD may produce consequences

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that could overwhelm units conducting the MPF offload and will therefore require a collective and collaborative use of CBR-D assets to maximize readiness.

4. Discussion. To operate in a CBR-D environment, all units assigned to CMPF must be trained and equipped to conduct continuous MPF operations minimizing the effect of WMD in the Arrival and Assembly Area (AAA). Enclosures (1) through (23) will aid in preparing our forces for operations in CBR-D environment and reduce the effect of CBR weapons during the MPF offload. CMPF and its subordinate elements will be organized, equipped, and trained to take defensive measures against an enemy's intent to use WMD without significantly impacting or delaying the scheduled offload of the MPF ships. The key to success while operating in a CBR-D environment will be based on the following factors: planning ahead, avoiding detection, early warning, maintaining discipline, seeking protection/shelter, dispersal, maintaining mobility, protecting supplies/equipment, limiting exposure, and preventing the spread of contamination, and decontamination. Readiness includes individual and team training, as well as defense systems operability. Determining the optimum quantity of material and equipment needed to protect an activity from an unpredictable attack based on limited information on enemy chemical and biological agents is not an exact process. All personnel assigned to the MPF organization are responsible for CBR-D of the Arrival and Assembly Area. Well-trained personnel, properly maintained equipment, and the rapid implementation of CBR defensive procedures will enhance the ability to combat a CBR attack. A brief explanation of the enclosures follows:

a. Enclosure (1) depicts the CBR-D organization in the Arrival and Assembly Area that can quickly mobilize CBR-D and provide rapid assistance when confronted by CBR threat. The Disaster Preparedness Officer (DPO), Site Disaster Preparedness Officer (SDPO), Disaster Preparedness Operations, Training Specialist (DPOTS) and the Emergency Response Team (ERT) are the key elements of the organization.

b. Enclosure (2) will provide valuable information regarding CBR threat in the geographic locations where units are assigned to conduct MPF operations. This information will assist the Force Security Officer (FSO) in drafting the CBR-D supplement to the force protection plan.

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c. Enclosure (3) provides guidance on replenishment of expended equipment and supplies to enable MPF units to operate continuously.

d. Enclosure (4) addresses all required training for MPF deployers and key members of the CBR-D organization.

e. Enclosure (5) discusses the capability and composition of the Emergency Response Team (ERT).

f. Enclosure (6) illustrates the layout of the decontamination and control area.

g. Enclosure (7) lists standard equipment for personnel protection.

h. Enclosure (8) contains guidance from CMPF Medical Officer for issuing medical supplies.

i. Enclosure (9) will contain the Commander's guidance on the order of priority for ERT response during a CBR attack.

j. Enclosure (10) will provide information on shelters for MPF personnel in case of a CBR attack.

k. Enclosure (11) through (20) contains valuable information regarding CBR employment factors, various checklists to gage MPF readiness against a CBR threat, and brief description of Mission Oriented Protection Postures (MOPP) levels and NBC THREATCON Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie.

l. Enclosure (21) lists equipment that is susceptible to the effects of electromagnetic pulse.

m. Enclosure (22) provides information on required reports and example formats for CBR-D reporting and guidance on initial CBR-D inchop report, CBR-D readiness feeder reports, voice and incident reports.

n. Enclosure (23) explains various alarm (sound and visual) conditions associated with CBR-D warning and notification of attack.

5. Responsibilities

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a. Commander, Maritime Prepositioning Force (CMPF)

(1) Retain overall responsibility for CBR-D readiness of the Arrival and Assembly Area.

(2) Promulgate Commander's guidance for CBR-D planning.

(3) Establish allowable radiation exposure limits.

(4) Review and approve the CBR-D supplement to the overall force protection plan.

(5) Direct and oversee the CBR-D training of all forces assigned to conduct MPF operations in the Arrival and Assembly Area.

(6) Designate the appropriate Mission-Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) level.

b. Force Security Officer (FSO)

(1) Draft and submit CBR-D supplement (using format in reference (c) to the Force Protection Plan) for approval by CMPF. Include designated shelters (enclosure 10) for MPF personnel and recommended priority list (enclosure 9) for ERT response.

(2) Supervise CBR-D response cell (DPO, ERT plotter, and CMPF Watch Officer) located in MAST II.

(3) Train all MPF personnel assigned to CMPF on the CBR-D protective measures stipulated in the force protection plan.

(4) Ensure all Seaward Security Officer (SSO) and Landward Security Officer (LSO) personnel are outfitted with Individual Protective Equipment (IPE).

(5) Ensure all SSO and LSO personnel are organized, trained, and equipped to perform their respective primary and secondary roles in CBR-D environment.

(6) Appoint a SDPO and DPOTS to oversee CBR-D readiness.

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(7) Deploy a CBR alarm system (for each site) that can provide warning to all FSO units of impending CBR attack. Implement a CBR alarm activation process outlined in enclosure (23).

c. Naval Support Element (NSE) Commander

(1) Advise CMPF and FSO on all matters pertaining to CBR-D readiness at the sites under control of NSE.

(2) Ensure all CMPF and NSE personnel are equipped with IPE.

(3) Ensure all NSE personnel are organized, trained, and equipped to perform their specific roles in CBR-D environment.

(4) Appoint SDPO and DPOTS to oversee CBR-D readiness.

(5) Train and equip a MPF ERT(s) for CBR-D operations.

(6) Deploy a CBR alarm system (for each site) that can provide warning to all NSE units of impending CBR attack. Implement a CBR alarm activation process outlined in enclosure (23).

d. Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadron (MPSRON) Commander

(1) Advise CMPF and FSO on all matters pertaining to CBR-D readiness with respect to MPF ships and personnel.

(2) Ensure all MPSRON personnel are organized, trained, and equipped to perform their roles in a CBR-D environment.

(3) Equip all MPSRON personnel with IPE.

(4) Appoint a SDPO to oversee CBR-D readiness of the MPF ships.

e. MPF CBR-D Officer

(1) Advise the CMPF Commander on all issues affecting CBR-D readiness.

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(2) Coordinate the training of MPF personnel in CBR-D procedures.

(3) Assist FSO in the development and publication of force protection plan related to CBR-D posture.

(4) Assist in the accomplishment of all CBR-D preparatory measures upon employment of MPF.

(5) Assess and reports status of CBR-D readiness (material and training) prior to deployment.

f. MPF Disaster Preparedness Officer (DPO)

(1) Report to CMPF/FSO on all issues pertaining to CBR-D in the Arrival and Assembly Area.

(2) Coordinate with element commanders on the employment of ERT.

(3) Prepare and submit all CBR-D related reports during deployment.

(4) Oversee the implementation of CBR readiness outlined in the force protection plan.

(a) Recommend appropriate MOPP levels.

(b) Coordinate with Force Security Officer to ensure the force protection plan supports operating in CBR-D environment.

(5) Coordinate with NSE, MPSRON and FSO for CBR-D to ensure compliance with established procedures.

(6) Track and report CBR-D readiness within the Arrival and Assembly Area.

(7) Coordinate MPF CBR-D drills.

(8) Coordinate with CMPF Watch Officer to ensure CBR-D THREATCON/MOPP levels/Readiness Postures are implemented.

g. Site Disaster Preparedness Officer (SDPO).

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(1) Responsible to element commander for CBR-D readiness.

(2) Coordinate and report CBR-D readiness within a designated site via the element commander (FSO, NSE Commander, and COMPSRON).

(3) Exercise command and control (C2) over the ERT.

(4) Implement CBR-D preparations at a designated site.

(5) Coordinate and conduct CBR-D drills.

h. Disaster Preparedness Operations and Training Specialist (DPOTS)

(1) Make all reports to CBR-D Officer pertaining to CBR-D readiness at the site.

(2) Ensure appropriate material maintenance is performed to ensure readiness of CBR-D equipment.

(3) Prior to deployment, track and maintain the CBR-D qualifications of ERT and site personnel.

(4) Assist the CBR-D Officer in implementing the CBR-D preparations at the site.

(5) Direct and assist in coordinating CBR-D training drills.

i. Emergency Response Team (ERT)

(1) Team leader reports to SDPO.

(2) Team leader will ensure the team is organized, trained, and equipped to conduct equipment decontamination, personnel decontamination, survey/monitor and plotting operations.

(3) Provide emergency medical treatment and evacuation (to an uncontaminated site) to injured personnel.

j. MPF Operations Officer

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(1) Keep the CMPF and FSO appraised of any impact on operations as a result of the state CBR-D readiness and or CBR threat.

(2) Track and monitor all operations in the Arrival and Assembly Area with CBR-D readiness as a priority.

(3) Ensure timely dissemination of CBR-D information to subordinate units, including the setting of THREATCON/MOPP levels/Readiness Posture.

(4) Direct CMPF Watch Officer to log and record all CBR-D pertinent information.

(5) Direct CMPF Watch Officer to track all preparations using existing checklist for CBR-D.

k. MPF Supply Officer

(1) Develop (in coordination with NBG-1 and IUWG-1 prior to MPF deployment) a CBR-D equipment resupply/sustainment plan as per enclosure (3) and in accordance with reference (c).

(2) Identify funding sources for purchase of CBR-D equipment and materials.

(3) Coordinate with Medical Officer to ensure available medical supplies are adequate to support the mission.

i. MPF Medical Officer

(1) Promulgate a list of medical protection assets (vaccines, pretreatment and skin protectants).

(2) Develop a plan for using medical protection assets.

(3) Determine the immunization protocol.

(4) Develop a mass casualty plan in the event an enemy uses WMD.

(5) Determine nonmilitary medical assistance availability for specified geographic area.

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(6) Determine alternate avenues in a given theater to supplement medical assistance shortfalls.

(7) Coordinate medical training to the medical protection forces assigned to CMPF.

(8) Advise CMPF of medical policy with regards to decontaminating and evacuating the injured.

m. MPF Intelligence Officer

(1) Develop intelligence report of enemy's CBR capabilities and intent (type of strike, priority of ports, airfields, and other locations).

(2) Collect, analyze, evaluate and disseminate timely intelligence on enemy's intent and prospective method on employment of WMD (agent of choice for specific scenarios, enemy anticipated concept of operation with respect to WMD).

(3) Access national and theater assets to ascertain the enemy's CBR capability.

(4) Maintain a current intelligence picture of the location and capabilities of the enemy CBR capabilities and forces.

(5) Coordinate with joint assets to maximize situation awareness with respect to the enemy's WMD capability.

n. MPF Legal Officer

(1) Ascertain theater CBR rules of engagement and provide requisite training to all MPF personnel.

o. MPF NCIS Agent

(1) Maintain current intelligence and situation awareness on enemy/terrorist threat from CBR weapons in the Arrival and Assembly Area.

(2) Advise CMPF and FSO on CBR-D force protection matters.

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(3) Assist Intelligence Officer on CBR threat analysis.

p. MPF Personnel

(1) All personnel will be fitted with a full set of IPE.

(2) It is the responsibility of all personnel to be prepared to accomplish the MPF mission throughout the full spectrum of CBR-D employment.

(3) Each individual assigned to MPF must train, equip, and prepare to operate in the CBR environment.

6. Applicability. This instruction is applicable to all personnel assigned to Amphibious Group THREE and those commands from which augment personnel will be requested to deploy in support of MPF operations.

7. Action. The intent of this instruction is to provide guidance on the scope of training and equipment necessary to prepare for operations at a fixed location where an enemy may employ WMD to disrupt MPF operations. This is not a CBR-D plan, but instead guidance to increase readiness in a hostile environment ranging across the spectrum of military conflicts, from anti-terrorism measures to full warfare. The FSO will act as CMPF's agent for developing a CBR-D supplement to the overall force protection plan. When assigned as CMPF, COMPHIBGRU THREE will execute defensive posture responsibilities, with respect to CBR-D readiness, of all personnel deploying to USCENTCOM and USPACOM AORs in support of MPF operations. COMPHIBGRU THREE Staff and organizations specifically assigned in support of MPF operations, will make CBR-D readiness a priority for all future deployments. COMPHIBGRU THREE Staff will coordinate planning for CMPF operations in a CBR environment with supported/ supporting USMC forces as required.


T. P. LABRECQUE
Chief of Staff

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Distribution: (Cont'd)

COMUSFORKOREA

COMTHIRDFLT

COMUSNAVCENT/COMFIFTHFLT

COMPHIBGRU ONE

CG I MEF

CG III MEF

COMNAVBEACHGRU ONE

COMPSRON ONE

COMPSRON TWO

COMPSRON THREE

COMNCWGRU ONE


PHIBCB ONE

ACU ONE

BMU ONE

NAVCHAPGRU

CMPF CBR-D ORGANIZATION MAR 03 2000



NOTE: 1. CPG-3 designated CBR-D officer to oversee training prior to deployment.

2. SDPO designated by FSO, COMPSRON, & NSE CDR works/reports directly to their CDRS for CBR-D readiness, training, & operations during a MPF deployment.

3. The FSO SDPO will also act as CMPF DPO for overall CBR readiness of the Arrival and Assembly Area.

4. ERT is charged with responding to an CBR incident at the direction of the DPO/SDPO.

5. DPOTS will ensure training of ERT; maintains CBR equipment in peak operating condition.

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CBR-D Intelligence Report
(Secret when filled in)

Key Judgements

(WHO, WHAT, WHEN, HOW, WHERE, WHY)

Enemy CHEM-BIO Agent Inventory
(Order of Battle)

Weaponization and Tactics
(Employment and delivery methods)

CHEM-BIO Doctrine
(History and Background in the use of WMD)

Conclusion - Threat Assessment
(Will they use it or not?)

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CBR Equipment Resupply/Sustainment Plan

1. Additional CBR bulk consumable supplies (protective suits, decon detergents, canisters, super tropical bleach, and other expendable CBR items) are prestaged at Bldg 808 at NAB, Coronado for shipment via airlift to an overseas location. This equipment will be included in the TPFDD.

2. To sustain longterm operations in a CBR environment, the resupply of consumable equipment will be procured through the supply system in both CENTCOM and PACOM AORs. In CENTCOM, resupply of CBR consumables is arranged with U.S. Army at Camp Doha in Bahrain, through ASU Bahrain/NAVCENT N41.

3. CMPF Supply Officer, working in concert with supply representatives from NSE and FSO, will develop a detailed plan of required CBR consumables during the MPF planning process. The resupply plan should at minimum contain a list of available CBR consumable equipment, CBR shortfalls, and established procedures to fill remaining requirements during deployment in PACOM/CENTCOM.

4. SLRP and Advance Party supply representatives will identify procedures shortly after arriving in theater for resupply of CBR consumables and relay this information for inclusion in the CBR supplement to the Force Protection Plan.

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CBR-D TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

1. The CMPF's minimum CBR training requirements provide the baseline for building a strong chemical, biological, and radiological defense organization. The CMPF organization will have a Disaster Preparedness Officer. Each major site will have one Site DPO and one Enlisted Specialist (EDPO). The CMPF organization must be capable of monitoring and assessing the contamination and independently initiating effective response actions.

2. CBR Training Requirements.

a. Disaster Preparedness Officer (NOBC 2715).

(1) Related Codes: NOBC - 2740, 2765.

(2) DOD Group - 4J Safety.

b. Disaster Preparedness Operations and Training Specialists (NEC9598).

(1) Paygrade E-6 to E-8.

(2) Mandatory Course CIN# A-494-0006.

c. Individual MPF Personnel Core Competency.

(1) IPE Gear.

(a) Proficient in wearing Chemical Protective Overgarments (CPO) and in using protective equipment (IPE).

(b) Conducted by DPOTS (NEC 9598) or designated personnel at parent command.

(c) Within 90 days of reporting aboard and before any operations.

(2) Operational Decontamination (DECON) Team.

(a) Proficient in operational DECON of personnel and equipment.

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(b) Able to change suits without removing mask and remove gross contamination from personnel and equipment.

(3) Detailed Troop DECON (DTD) Team. Be familiar with DTD.

(4) Medical Brief. Briefed on effects of CBR contamination.

(5) Personal Qualification Standards (PQS).

(a) Completed prior to deploying or within 90 days of reporting which ever is first.

(b) Those qualified at previous command must requalify.

(c) Signed-off by parent command DPOTS or designated personnel.

3. Additional training that will increase the survivability readiness of CMPF includes:

a. Cross-train personnel to perform CBR functions beyond their normal rate training (e.g., decontamination, detection, monitoring, first aide).

b. Ensure all personnel are qualified in their jobs and basic CBR.

c. Plan for worst-case scenarios, to include:

(1) Type or number of weapons that may inflict the worst damage, including interruption of communications and power outages.

(2) The propensity for damage to spread throughout the camp or other manned operating areas.

(3) Adding any hazardous material (HAZMAT) or fuels to the existing threat.

(4) Awareness of the camp layout for maximum extent of sustainment if one element is temporarily taken out.

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- d. Designate all available primary, secondary, and emergency communication circuits, and practice lost-communications procedures.
- e. Conduct training in first-aid for burns, shocks, smoke asphyxiation, major wounds, heat illness, CPR, and electrical shock.
- f. Reposition personnel to avoid potential threats, such as deep shelter or just indoor shelter.
- g. Develop a plan to provide drinking water, food, and rest to personnel involved in casualty restoration or fire fighting.

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EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM (ERT)

1. Capability

- a. All personnel involved in MPF mission have core competency.
- b. All 60 ERT members have CBR Team Training and 30 members have command center staff training.
- c. CBR detection and communication is setup for each work site and living area.
- d. ERT is capable of conducting detailed troop and equipment DECON operations at two (2) separate sites.
- e. Survey and plotting teams available to assess MOPP level and tracking.
- f. Medical support available.
- g. Core of 60 personnel divided up into 4 teams: Equipment DECON, Personnel DECON, Survey/Monitor, and plotters.

2. Duties and Responsibilities

- a. Senior Medical Officer (HMC or above).
 - (1) Ensures heat stress guidelines are adhered to during training.
 - (2) Training personnel in first aid and buddy aid for CBR-D.
- b. Supply Department LCPO (SKC or above).
 - (1) Ensures that all CBR-D supplies are available and that the unit is able to deploy at any time with the required equipment.
 - (2) Ensures that all records are kept in proper order.
- c. Administrative Department LPO (YN1 or above).

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(1) Ensure CBR-D correspondence and instructions are kept up to date.

d. Communications (RM2 or above).

(1) Responsible for all communications equipment and ERT communications.

e. Platoon Commander for Detailed Troop DECON, DTD, (First Class Petty Officer).

(1) Platoon removes contaminated MOPP gear, including the protective mask from non-seriously injured personnel.

(2) Responsible for setting up, operating and closing the DTD in a through DECON site.

(3) In conjunction with the Equipment DECON PLT CDR, recommends location and alternate locations of the thorough decon site.

(4) Reviews DTD inventory from Supply Dept for completeness and availability of DTD equipment.

(5) Recommends purchase of new DTD equipment.

f. Assistant Platoon Commander for Detailed Troop DECON, (First Class Petty Officer).

(1) Assist the Platoon Commander in their duties and to replace the Platoon Commander in the event that they become disabled.

g. Squad Leader for Detailed Troop DECON (DTD), (Second Class Petty Officer).

(1) Responsible to set up DECON teams, along with work details IAW the Platoon Commander's assignments.

(2) Supervise any operation involved with Detailed Troop DECON.

h. Platoon Commander for Detailed Equipment DECON (DED), (First Class Petty Officer).

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(1) Platoon removes contamination from NSE support equipment of all sizes.

(2) Responsible for setting up, operating and closing the DED in a through DECON site.

(3) In conjunction w/ Troop DECON PLT CDR, recommends location and alternate locations of the thorough DECON site.

(4) Reviews DED inventory from Supply Dept for completeness and availability of DED equipment.

(5) Recommends purchase of new equipment for DED.

i. Assistant Platoon Commander for Detailed Equipment DECON, DED, (First Class Petty Officer).

(1) Assist the Platoon Commander in their duties and to replace the Platoon Commander in the event that they become disabled.

j. Squad Leader for Detailed Equipment DECON, DED, (Second Class Petty Officer).

(1) Responsible to set up DECON teams, along with work details IAW the Platoon Commander's assignments.

(2) Supervise any operation involved with Detailed Troop DECON.

k. Platoon Commander for Survey, Plotters, Monitor, and Alarm (First Class Petty Officer).

(1) Platoon conducts surveys of assigned areas to determine location and levels of contamination mark off contaminated areas.

(2) Responsible for setting up, operation, and monitoring CBR-D equipment at four NSE sites, i.e., Camp, Beach, NSE portion of Pier, and Transportation Yard.

(3) Responsible for initial response to CBR-D site alarms.

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(4) Responsible for receiving information from the survey teams and plotting updating status boards in the COC.

(5) Reviews Survey, Monitor, and Alarm inventory from Supply Dept for completeness and availability of equipment.

(6) Recommends purchase of new equipment for Survey, Monitor, and Alarm systems.

l. Assistant Platoon Commander for Survey, Plotters, Monitor, and Alarm (First Class Petty Officer).


(1) Assist the Platoon Commander in their duties and to replace the Platoon Commander in the event that they become disabled.

m. Squad Leader for Survey, Plotters, Monitor, and Alarm (Second Class Petty Officer).


(1) Responsible to set up DECOM teams, along with work details IAW the Platoon Commanders assignments.

(2) Supervise any operation involved w/ Survey, Plotters, Monitor, and Alarm.

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ONE-LANE WASHDOWN WITH ONE LIGHTWEIGHT DECONTAMINATING SYSTEM (SHOWN ABOVE)
AND WITH TWO LIGHTWEIGHT DECONTAMINATING SYSTEM (BELOW).
ALLOW 50 METERS FROM THE LAST WASHDOWN POINT TO THE ASSEMBLY AREA



STEP 3
ASSEMBLY AREA
MOPP GEAR
EXCHANGE

Vehicle and Equipment Decon

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STANDARD CBR-D EQUIPMENT LIST

1. Purpose. To specify individual and organizational NBC equipment required for units deploying ashore to the NAVCENT AOR. Material required for shipboard personnel will be in accordance with service established allowances. Allocations for all other shore-based organizations should be verified and adjusted to comply with the below-listed minimum requirements.

2. Individual Protective Equipment (IPE) (Survival)

- a. Protective mask with two extra sets of combat filters.
- b. Three sets of protective overgarments, to include three sets of protective overboots and gloves and one replacement hood.
- c. Three 2-mg atropine autoinjector nerve kits.
- d. Two 600 mg pralidoxime chloride (2 PAM Chloride) injections.
- e. One bottle tetracycline hydrochloride capsules.
- f. Seven day supply of pyridostigmine-bromide (to be used only upon direction from USCINCCENT).
- g. One Convulsant Antidote Nerve Agent Auto-Injector (CANA).
- h. Two 1 qt Canteens.
- i. One M258A1 Skin Decontaminating Kit.
- j. M291 Skin Decontaminating Kit (1 box/9 individuals).
- k. M9 Paper Chemical Agent Detector (1/5 individuals plus 10%).
- l. Two VGH, ABC-M8 Paper Chemical Agent Detector.
- m. DT60PD Detector Radiac Dosimeter.

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3. Organizational Equipment (Survival) Requirements for base concentrations are as follows:

- a. Alarm, Chemical Agent, Automatic: Portable, Manpack MBA1, 6665-1-105,5623.
- b. M10A1, Power Supply, 6130-01-093-2739.
- c. Water Testing Kit, Chemical Agents: M272, 6665-01-134-0885.
- d. Area Predictor, Radiological Fallout: M5A2 7640-00-106-9595.
- e. Detector Kit, Chemical Agent: M256A1 6665-01-133-4964.
- f. Simulator, Detector Tickets, Chemical Agent: Training M256 6665-01-112-1644.
- g. Computer Indicator CP-95/PD2 6665-00-599-6313.
- h. Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM) 6665-01-199-4153.
- i. M21 Remote Sensing Chemical Agent Alarm (RSCAAL) 6665-01-324-6637.
- j. Portable Collective Protection Shelter M20 4240-01-166-2254.

4. Organization Equipment (Recovery) Requirements for base concentrations are as follows:

- a. Decontaminating Apparatus: Portable. 1 1/2 qt., M11 4230-00-720-1618.
- b. Decontaminating Apparatus M17, Power Driven Portable 4230-01-346-3122 (As of 9/2/97 program will be decommissioned soon).
- c. Decontaminating Agent STB (Bleach) 6850-00-297-6653.
- d. Detergent Wetting Agent, (Powder) 6850-00-294-8021.
- e. Detergent, General Purpose 7930-00-985-6911.

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- f. NBC Marking Set 9905-12-124-5955.
- g. Survey Meter Beta/Gamma Low Range AN/PDR-27R 6665-00-961-0846.
- h. Survey Meter Beta/Gamma High Range AN/PDR-43 6665-00-106-7554.
- i. Dosimeter, Low Dose Indicating IM-9 6665-00-138-7913.
- j. Dosimeter, High Dose Indicating IM-107 6665-00-626-9738.
- k. Charger, Dosimeter PP-4276(C) 6665-00-489-3106.

5. Action. Units deploying to USNAVCENT will ensure sufficient quantities of above equipment are available in-theater for assigned personnel, including sufficient reserves to equip personnel in transit or in a temporary duty status. Personnel in-theater for periods greater than 15 days require prior approval from host activity or they must supply their own IPE.

Note: Units will maintain appropriate numbers per NAVFACINST 3440.17 series.

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CBR-D MEDICATION DISTRIBUTION PLAN

1. Medications for CBR-D considered part of Individual Protection Equipment (IPE) will be issued to individuals prior to deployment in the following groups:

- a. SLRP
- b. ADVON
- c. Main Body

2. Medications considered IPE are as follows:

- a. Atropine (3 per individual)
- b. 2-Pam Chloride (3 per individual)
- c. CANA (1 per individual) (Valium requires strict accountability)

Note: The issue of CANA requires signature from individual for accountability. Individuals must return all CBR Medications, particularly the CANA to Medical Department personnel. Controlled Medicinal Inventory Board must be established.

3. The Ciprofloxacin (500mg Tabs 6 per individual) and Pyridostigmine-Bromnide (PB) (7 Day supply per individual will be maintained in Medical Department Stocks until required. This medication requires refrigeration). It has an indefinite shelf life, however, once removed from refrigeration the shelf life is reduced to six months.

4. The Supply departments of each element will bulk ship (preferably fly-in) the remainder of CBR-D medications for distribution to individual's upon arrival in the AO.

5. Individual issue of IPE Medications for CBR THREATCON Level's ZERO (Color code White) and THREATCON Level ONE (color Code GREEN) requires that medications are readily available.

6. Individual issue of IPE Medications CMPF personnel will occur at CBR THREATCON TWO (Color Code YELLOW) or greater.

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7. All personnel will receive training on the proper self-administration of the medications prior to issue to the individual. CBR officer and medical personnel will oversee the training and ensure individuals meet this requirement.

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DECONTAMINATION PRIORITY LIST

1. Unless modified by the CMPF, the following guidance will be used by FSO and DPO/SDPO in planning for MPF operation in a CBR environment that prioritizes the ERT response if the Arrival and Assembly Area (AAA) experiences an attack by WMD:

a. The first system to be decontaminated will be Radar Sonar Surveillance Center (RSSC) (equipment and personnel). RSSC is crucial to force protection through its surveillance operations of the inner/outer harbor area within the AAA. RSSC has excellent C2 capability enabling CMPF to continue C2 over subordinate elements in the AAA if the MAST II becomes contaminated.

b. Principle End Items (PEIs) from the MPF ships (equipment and personnel), to include those systems (COMMS, lighterage, cranes, LARCS, and etc) that support the offload of PEIs in order to expeditiously equip and activate the MAGTF for combat employment. This also includes OPDS/IPDS for sustainment/logistical support.

c. Inshore Boat Unit (IBU) personnel and equipment for interdiction and defensive operations to guard against enemy's penetration of the inner/outer harbor within the AAA.

d. Medical personnel, facilities and supplies. The importance here is medical support/aid to personnel to sustain OPTEMPO during the MPF offload in a CBR environment.

e. Non-essential personnel. Those personnel not directly associated with evolutions in a, b, c and d.

f. Life Support Equipment:

(a) Galley equipment/supplies.

(b) Tents-berthing facilities.

(c) Showers.

(d) Spare parts and resupply items.

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g. Mast II is next in line for an ERT response in order to fully reestablish full C4I capability. Mast II does not need to be immediate because of the C2 capability that exists in the RSSC.

h. Transportation. Vehicles use for administrative purposes and basic transportation between sites.

2. The above list is not all inclusive but prioritizes major functions that will allow CMPF to fulfill the mission of offloading and turning-over PEIs to MAGTF Commander and provide force protection during the arrival and assembly phase.

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READY SHELTER STATION-COLLECTIVE PROTECTIVE SHELTER (CPS)

1. When conducting MPF operations in a potential CBR environment, navy forces must be prepared to employ CPS's to minimize the effects of the attack on personnel. The CPS are not "stand alone," easy to assemble systems. Therefore, a considerable amount of planning and training is required to utilize them. In order to effectively employ the system, the following considerations apply:

a. Proper numbers of shelters are brought to the area of operations (1/40 personnel). This must be reflected in the Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) and must include associated support equipment (vehicles, generators, repair equipment, etc).

b. Camp and operation areas must account for designated staging and assembly sites.

c. Designate and train personnel in assembly of shelters.

d. Assignment of personnel to shelters.

e. Chem/Bio detectors within CPS.

f. DECON procedures prior to entering CPS.

g. Security.

h. Communications with units outside CPS.

2. Responsibilities:

a. COMPHIBGRU THREE (CMPF) will:

(1) Determine need to deploy CPS to area of operations and notify CNBG-I.

(2) Approve plans for deployment and employment of CPS.

(3) Coordinate intra-theater sustainment stocks if required.

b. COMNAVBEACHGRU ONE (CNSE) will:

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(1) Act as CMPF representative for acquisition of adequate numbers of shelters and associated support equipment.

(2) Provide TPFDD inputs incorporating CPS's and associated support equipment to CMPF.

(3) Designate staging and assembly areas within applicable camps and operation areas.

(4) Coordinate with the Force Security Officer (FSO) and Emergency Response Team (ERT) leaders for assignment of personnel to shelters.

c. COMPHIBCB ONE will:

(1) Store and maintain CPS's.

(2) Designate appropriate maintenance and assembly personnel.

(3) Develop procedures for conduct of personnel within the CPS (i.e., drinking, eating, when to depart the CPS etc.)

(4) Conduct annual unit level training on assembly of CPS's.

(5) Coordinate with FSO to conduct CMPF on-site CPS brief.

d. FSO will:

(1) Develop CPS security procedures.

(2) Brief security personnel on CPS procedures.

(3) Coordinate employment of the CPS with the Senior ERT leader and brief CMPF on all issues pertaining to CPS.

3. The following CPS employment and assembly procedures apply:

a. MOPP level-1 CPS's staged at assembly areas with required support equipment. Personnel briefed on shelter assignments and procedures.

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b. MOPP level-2: CPS's laid out with generators and support equipment hooked up (ready for assembly).

c. MOPP level-3: CPS's assembled and ready to receive personnel. Conduct communications systems checks.

d. MOPP level-4: Designated personnel muster at shelter and prepare to enter, upon detection of chemical or biological agent or when directed.

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CHEMICAL AGENT EMPLOYMENT (NONPERSISTENT) WEATHER FACTORS

The threat will most likely employ chemical agents under favorable weather conditions to increase their effectiveness. Weather factors considered are temperature, air stability, wind, humidity, and precipitation. Although not weather variables, terrain and vegetation also play roles in employment. Favorable, moderately favorable, unfavorable weather and terrain conditions for tactical employment of a chemical aerosol or vapor cloud are summarized in the table.

If a chemical cloud is to be placed directly on an occupied area, the best possible weather is calm winds with a strong, stable temperature gradient. Under this condition, the cloud diffuses over the target with minimum dilution and does not move away. Such conditions are most apt to occur on a calm, clear night. If a small amount of air movement is required to spread the cloud evenly over the target area, a low wind speed and stable or neutral conditions are most favorable. These conditions most often occur on a clear night, a cloudy night, or a cloudy day. When the desired effect is for the chemical cloud to travel, the most favorable conditions are stable or neutral conditions with a low to medium wind speed of 5 to 13 KPH. These conditions may be present on a clear night, a cloudy night, or a cloudy day. The presence of low-to-medium wind speeds keeps the cloud traveling over the area without too much diffusion, and the stable or neutral conditions keep the agent concentration high and the cloud close to the ground. Favorable terrain conditions for a chemical cloud are smooth or gently rolling contours or wooded areas. Unfavorable conditions for chemical clouds (usually found on clear days) are extreme or marked turbulence, wind speeds above 19 KPH, an unstable dispersion category, rain, or rough terrain. A table of these various factors relating to favorable conditions follows:

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TABLE OF CHEMICAL AGENT EMPLOYMENT (NONPERSISTENT) WEATHER FACTORS

FACTORS	FAVORABLE	MODERATELY FAVORABLY	UNFAVORABLE
Wind	Steady < 5 KPH	Steady 5-13 KPH	-For artillery employment if speed is > 13 KPH - For aerial bombs if > 19 KPH
Air stab.	Stable	Neutral	Unstable
Temperature	> 21 °C	4-21 °C	< 4 °C
Precip.	None	Light	Any
Cloud cover	-Broken low clouds at night -Broken medium clouds at night - Overcast or broken high clouds at night -Scattered clouds of all types at night - Clear sky at night	-Thick low overcast -Thick middle overcast	-Broken low clouds during daytime -Broken middle clouds during daytime -Overcast or broken high clouds during daytime -Clouds of vertical development
Terrain	Even terrain or open water	Gently rolling terrain	Hilltops or mountain crest
Vegetation*	Sparse or none	Medium dense	Heavily wooded or jungle
* Cloud dissemination occurs above the canopy.			

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CHEMICAL AGENT EMPLOYMENT (PERSISTENT) WEATHER FACTORS

Weather, terrain vegetation, soil, and some other surfaces affect the rate of evaporation, which in turn influences the persistence of a chemical agent liquid and the concentration of the vapor. Most weather conditions do not affect the quantity of munitions needed for an effective initial liquid contamination:

The following table summarizes favorable, moderately favorable, and unfavorable weather and terrain conditions for liquid chemical agent employment. When a liquid agent is used to cause casualties through contact with the liquid in crossing or occupying the area, its duration of effectiveness is greatest when the soil temperature is just above the agent's freezing point. This limited the liquid's evaporation rate. Other favorable conditions are low wind speed, wooded areas, and no rain. Conditions for using liquid agents for vapor concentration effects are much the same as those for chemical clouds (preceding table). In woods, however, a high temperature with only a very light wind gives the highest vapor concentration.

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FACTORS	FAVORABLE	MODERATELY FAVORABLE	UNFAVORABLE
Liquid agents employed for liquid contamination			
Wind	Low wind speeds for agents with significant vapor pressure.	Moderate wind speeds	-High wind speeds, except liquid agents with little vapor pressure, which are only slightly affected. - High temperature.
Air stability	Stable	Neutral	Unstable
Temperature	Surface temperature just above the agent's freezing point	Intermediate	High soil temperature
Humidity	High	Intermediate	Low
Precipitation	None	Light rain	Heavy
Vegetation	Sparse or none	Intermediate	-Heavily wooded -Jungle canopy
Soil	Intermediate (between porous and bare dry)	porous	Bare, hard ground
Liquid agents employed as aerial spray for casualty effect			
Wind	Low wind speeds with a small degree of turbulence.	Intermediate	High wind speeds and high turbulence.
Air stability	Neutral	Stable if released below the inversion cap.	Unstable
Temperature	Intermediate to high	Intermediate	Low
Humidity	High	Intermediate	Low
Precipitation	None	Light or transitional	Heavy
Vegetation	None	Light brush or wood	Heavily wooded/ Jungle canopy

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COMMON INDUSTRIAL HAZARDS

CHEMICAL	APPEARANCE	SMELL	IRRITATION
Nitric Acid	Colorless or yellow/refuming Liquid	Acrid, suffocating	Yes
Phosgene	Colorless gas	Suffocating, musty hay	Yes
Phosphorus Trichloride	Colorless to yellow fuming liquid	Hydrochloric acid-like	Yes
Sulfur Dioxide	Colorless gas	Pungent	Yes
Sulfur Acid	Colorless to dark brown oily liquid	Odorless	Yes
Tungsten Hexafluoride	Light yellow liquid	Odorless	Yes

Source: "Guide to Understanding the Threat", from Toiz Industrial Chemicals.

Note: Table is not all-inclusive and merely represents examples of industrial chemicals. Irritation means any discomfort to the eyes or mucous membranes.

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BIOLOGICAL AGENT EMPLOYMENT WEATHER FACTORS

WEATHER VARIABLE	FAVORABLE	MARGINABLE	UNFAVORABLE
Wind speed below 16 meters altitude (Km/hr)	15-32	9-15	<9 or >31
Air stability	Stable	Neutral	Lapse
Temperature (degrees Celsius)	1-20	<0, 21-29	>30
Moderate to light	None to light	Light	Moderate to light
Humidity (%)	>60	40-60	<40

Note: Table provides general employment factors. There are exception and variances to data. The chemical and intelligence staff must determine the agents that an enemy is capable of employing, then research the properties of those agents with regards to weather factors.

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POSSIBLE MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT BIOLOGICAL AGENTS, BACTERIA

DISEASE	DISSEMINATION	TRANSMISSIBILITY	INFECTIVITY	INCUBATION TIME	ILLNESS DURATION	LETHALITY (%)	PERSISTENCE
Inhalation Anthrax	Spores in aerosols	No	Moderate	Few hours to 7 days; most cases occur within 48 hrs of exposure	3-5 days	Treated: presymptomatic rare Untreated: 100	Spores are very stable, remaining viable for years in soil
Brucellosis (undulant, Malta, or Mediterranean Fever)	1. Aerosol 2. Sabotage (food supply)	Rare	High	5-60 days (highly variable)	Weeks to years	Treated: rare Untreated: 3	Months in wet soil or carcasses
Cholera	1. Sabotage (food and water supply) 2. Aerosol	Negligible except in conditions of poor hygiene.	Low	Few hours to 5 days, usually 2-3 days.	1 or more weeks	Treated: rare Untreated: 50	Unstable in aerosols and fresh water, stable for long periods in salt water
Glanders	Aerosols	Rare	High	Days to years	Days to several weeks	Treated: rare Untreated: >90	2-3 weeks in decaying matter
Melioidosis	Aerosols	No	High	2 days (several months/years may lapse between exposure and clinical disease)	4-10 days	Treated: rare Untreated: variable	Stable in soil and water

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POSSIBLE MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT BIOLOGICAL AGENTS, BACTERIA (CONTINUED)

DISEASE	DISSEMINATION	TRANSMISSIBILITY	INFECTIVITY	INCUBATION TIME	ILLNESS DURATION	LETHALITY (%)	PERSISTENCE
Pneumonic plague	Aerosols	High	High	1-7 days	1-6 days	Treated: rare Untreated: 100	Up to one year in soil, 270 days in bodies
Shigellosis	Sabotage (food and water supply)	High, caused by lapses in hygiene.	Low	1-2 days	1-14 days	Treated: <1 Untreated: 3-8	Up to 30 days in foods, 3 days in sea water
Tularemia (Rabbit or Deer-Fly Fever)	Aerosols	No	High	1-14 days	2 or more weeks	Treated: <1 Untreated: 5-25	Months on moist soil or snow water, straw, grain dust or carcass.
Typhoid Fever	1. Sabotage (food and water supply) 2. Aerosol	Negligible except in conditions of poor hygiene.	Low	3-60 days	Several weeks	Treated <1 untreated: 12	Weeks in water, ice, dust, dried sewage

Source: Fm 8-33 and Development of a Trinational Biodefense Concept.

Notes: 1. This table is not all-inclusive and dose not imply weaponization or the ability to weaponize exists.

2. For explanatory notes see page F-2.

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BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR RADIATION
(STANAG 2083, Edition 5)

DOSE RANGE (cGy FREE-IN-AIR)	INITIAL SYMPTOMS	PERFORM MEASURE (MID RANGE FOR DOSE)	MEDICAL CARE/DISPOSITION
0-70	From 6-12 hrs: none to slight incidence of transient head ache and nausea, vomiting in up to 5% of personnel in upper part of dose range.	Combat effective	None. RTD None
71-150	From 2-20 hrs: transient mild nausea and vomiting in up to 5-30% of personnel.	Combat effective	None. RTD: no deaths anticipated
151-300	From 2 hrs to 2 days: transient mild to moderate nausea and vomiting in 20-70%, mild to moderate fatigability and weakness in 25-60% of personnel.	DT: PD from 4 hrs until recovery UT: PD from 6 hrs to 1 day, 6 weeks until recovery	At 3-5 weeks: medical care for 10-50%. At low end of range, <5% deaths. At high end, death may occur in up to 10%; survivors RTD.
301-500	From 2 hrs to 3 days: transient moderate nausea and vomiting in 50-90%, moderate fatigability in 50-90% at high end of range.	DT: PD from 3 hrs until death or recovery UT: PD from 4 hrs to 2 day and from 2 weeks until death or recovery	At 2-5 weeks: medical care for 20-60%. At low end of range, <10% deaths. At high end, death may occur for more than 50%; survivors RTD.
501-800	Within first hr: moderate to severe nausea, vomiting fatigability and weakness in 80-100% of personnel.	DT: PD from 1 hrs to 3 weeks; CI from 3 weeks until death	At 10 days to 5 weeks: medical care for 50-100%.

Legend:

CI- Combat ineffective (<25% performance capable)

DT- Demanding task

PD- Performance degraded (25-75% performance)

UT- Undemanding task

RTD- return to duty

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BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR RADIATION (Continued)
(STANAG 2083, Edition 5)

DOSE RANGE (cGy FREE-IN-AIR)	INITIAL SYMPTOMS	PERFORM MEASURE (MID RANGE FOR DOSE)	MEDICAL CARE/DISPOSITION
801-3,000	Within first 3 minutes; severe nausea, vomiting, fatigability, weakness, dizziness and disorientation; moderate to severe fluid imbalance and headache	UT: PD from 2 hrs to 2 days and from 7 days to 4 weeks, CI from 4 weeks until death. DT: PD from 45 minutes to 3 hrs; CI from 3 hrs until death. UT: PD from 1-7 hrs; CI from 7 hrs to 1 day; PD from 1-4 days; CI from 4 days until death.	6 weeks. At high end, death may occur for 90% at 3-5 weeks. Medical care from 3 minutes until death. 1,000 cGy: 100% deaths at 2-3 weeks 3,000 cGy: 100% death at 5-10 days.
3,001-8,000	Within first 3 minutes; severe nausea vomiting, fatigability, weakness, dizziness disorientation, fluid imbalance, headache and collapse	DT: CI from 3-35 minutes; PD from 35-70 minutes; CI from 70 minutes until death UT: CI from 3-20 minutes; PD from 20-80 minutes until death	Medical care from 3 minutes until death 4,500 cGy: 100% deaths at 2-3 days.
>8,000	Within first 3 minutes; severe and prolonged nausea, vomiting, fatigability, weakness, dizziness, disorientation; fluid imbalance, headache, and collapse	DT and UT: CI from 3 minutes until death.	Medical care needed immediately 8,000 cGy: 100% deaths at 1 day.

Legend:

CI- Combat ineffective (<25% performance capable)
 DT- Demanding task
 PD- Performance degraded (25-75% performance)
 UT- Undemanding task
 RTD- return to duty

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CHEMICAL ATTACK RISK CHECKLIST

Threat Capabilities and Intentions	Yes or Possible	No
Enemy's national policy permits chemical weapon use?		
Enemy has chemical weapon employment doctrine?		
Enemy would doctrinally target unit?		
Enemy is capable of locating unit?		
Enemy is trained and equipped to operate in chemical environment?		
Enemy has internal warning system?		
Is there a production capability?		
Has enemy purchased weapons from other countries?		
Are there known terrorist threat capabilities?		
Are there connections to known terrorist supporting countries?		
Industrial chemical (dye, pesticide, or other) plants exist?		
Ability to weaponize exists?		
Is there a known stockpile?		
Are friendly units within delivery systems' ranges?		
Favorable conditions, such as weather and terrain, exist for employment?		
Intelligence sources (electronic or human) show probable use?		
Enemy has used chemical weapons in theater?		
NOTES:		

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BIOLOGICAL ATTACK RISK CHECKLIST

Threat Capabilities and Intentions	Yes or Possible	No
Enemy's national policy permits biological weapon use?		
Enemy has biological weapon employment doctrine?		
Enemy would doctrinally target unit?		
Enemy is capable of locating unit?		
Enemy is trained and equipped to operate in biological environment?		
Enemy has internal warning system?		
Is there a direct or indirect production capability (infectious diseases, toxins, or other)?		
Has enemy purchased weapons from other countries?		
Are there known terrorist threat capabilities?		
Are there connections to known terrorist supporting countries?		
Medical, biological research, or pharmaceutical facilities exist?		
Ability to weaponize exists?		
Is there a known stockpile?		
Are friendly units within delivery systems' ranges?		
Favorable conditions, such as weather and terrain, exist for employment?		
Intelligence sources (electronic or human) show probable use?		
Enemy has used biological weapons in theater?		
NOTES:		

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NUCLEAR ATTACK RISK CHECKLIST

Threat Capabilities and Intentions	Yes or Possible	No
Enemy's national policy permits nuclear weapons use?		
Enemy has nuclear employment doctrine?		
Enemy would doctrinally target unit?		
Enemy is capable of locating unit?		
Enemy is trained and equipped to operate in nuclear environment?		
Enemy has internal warning system?		
Is there a production capability?		
Other sources of radioactive material, such as nuclear power or waste plants?		
Has enemy purchased materiel/technology from other countries to support infrastructure?		
Are there known terrorist threat capabilities?		
Are there connections to known terrorist supporting countries?		
Are there known nuclear warheads?		
Is there a known stockpile?		
Are nuclear munitions present in our area of interest?		
Are units within nuclear delivery systems' (aerial, missiles, artillery, unconventional forces, other) ranges?		
Favorable conditions, such as weather and terrain, best for employment?		
Intelligence sources (electronic or human) show probable use?		
Enemy has used nuclear weapons in theater?		
NOTES:		

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MISSION-ORIENTED PROTECTIVE POSTURE (MOPP) LEVELS/
NBC RESPONSE MEASURES

1. Mission-Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) and the Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Response Measures provides the means for establishing levels of readiness for CBR/NBC warfare. MOPP furnishes a flexible system of protecting against chemical agents and is used in chemical warfare defense to help in accomplishing the mission. NBC Threat Response Measures are graduated levels of NBC defense readiness measures commensurate with the threat of WMD attack and are consistent with JCS THREATCON Protective Measures drawn from Joint Pub 3-07.2. Both measures are recommended actions that the commander should consider to mitigate the effects of a potential use of CBR/WMD on the unit mission. As the situation requires, commanders may dictate higher MOPP level/THREATCON measures to be taken than those recommended.

2. All operations are conducted under the MOPP system. The following are the four levels of MOPP readiness:

a. MOPP level-1:

(1) The lowest MOPP level and is set when a potential enemy has the capability of delivering CBR weapons in the immediate operational area.

(2) The overgarments will be worn either open or closed depending on the temperature. Overboots and gloves must be carried, and the mask with hood must be fitted, but carried and ready for immediate use.

b. MOPP level-2:

(1) Is set when an adversary has expressed a willingness to engage in CBR warfare, thereby increasing the threat potential.

(2) Wear overgarments, either open or closed, and overboots. The mask must be fitted for immediate use and carried, and the gloves will carried.

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c. **MOPP level-3:**

(1) Is set when U.S. higher authorities determine from an enemy's statements that their intent to employ CBR warfare against U.S. or allied forces, any changes in the potential or military posture of an enemy who possesses CBR capabilities, or the actual use of CBR warfare by an enemy within the operating area.

(2) Wear overgarments, overboots, and mask with hood. Overgarments and mask with hood may be worn open or closed depending on temperature. Gloves will be carried.

d. **MOPP level-4:**

(1) Is the highest MOPP level. This level is set when a CBR attack is imminent. This situation may be indicated when there is confirmation of increased activity involving delivery systems, recognized attack patterns, and when there is an electronic or visual indication of the use of delivery system.

(2) Individuals must protect themselves by wearing all of their protective clothing. The overgarments and mask with hood will be closed at this level of readiness regardless of the temperature.

3. The following guidelines can be used by commanders to determine NBC threat conditions:

a. **THREATCON NORMAL**

(1) Probability of WMD attack: Negligible. This condition exists when a general threat of possible terrorist WMD activity may exist, but warrants only a routine security posture.

b. **THREATCON ALPHA & BRAVO**

(1) Probability of WMD attack: Possible. This condition exists when an increased and more predictable threat of terrorist WMD use exist.

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c. **THREATCON CHARLIE**

(1) Probability of WMD attack: Probable. There are indicators that a terrorist may employ WMD in the immediate future in the CENTCOM AOR.

d. **THREATCON DELTA**

(1) Probability of WMD attack: High. This condition applies in the immediate area where a terrorist attack has occurred or when there is a strong indication of imminent use of WMD.

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EQUIPMENT ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE VULNERABILITIES

MOST SUSCEPTIBLE	LESS SUSCEPTIBLE	LEAST SUSCEPTIBLE
Low power, high speed digital computers	Vacuum tube equipment that do not include semiconductor rectifiers	High voltage 60Hz equipment
Systems employing transistors or semiconductors rectifiers	Transmitters	Transformers
Computers and power supplies	Receivers	Lamps (filament)
Semiconductor components terminating long cable runs, especially between sites	Alarm systems	Heaters
Alarm systems	Intercom systems	Air-insulated power cable runs
Intercom systems	Teletypes and telephones	Rotary converters
Life-support system control	Power supplies	Heavy-duty relays
Any partially transistorized telephone equipment	Equipment employing low-current switches, relays, meters	Circuit breakers
Transistorized receivers and transmitters	Alarms	
Transistorized 60-400Hz converters	Life-support systems	
Transistorized process control systems	Power system control panels	
Power system controls and communication links	Panel indicators and status boards	
	Process control	
	Hazardous equipment containing:	
	Detonators	
	Squibs	
	Pyrotechnical devices	
	Explosive mixtures	
	Rocket fuels	
	Other:	
	Long power cable runs employing dielectric insulation	
	Equipment associated with high-energy storage capacitors	
	Inductors	

Note: Table addresses likely equipment vulnerabilities. Individual items within each category can vary considerably with regards to EMP. Any equipment attached to a collector or antenna has increased vulnerability.

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REQUIRED REPORTS

1. Per Reference (e), reports are required to be submitted upon arrival in theater. This Inchop Report contains specific information regarding force readiness, is drafted by the Disaster Preparedness Officer (DPO) and released by COMPHIBGRU THREE. In order to provide accurate data, an Inchop Feeder Report will be required from all subordinate CMPF elements. This feeder will be due to the DPO 30 days prior to departure of CMPF Main Body or, if in support of contingency operations, at soonest possibility and no later than 24 hours prior to departure of Main Body. Daily SITREPS will be required upon arrival in theater. Information required for reports follows format provided:

a. Inchop Report

(1) Point of Contact for CBR (DPO)

(2) Equipment

(3) Location of Equipment

(4) Level of Training

(5) CBR Capability

(6) Readiness Summary

(a) Equipment Shortfalls (organizational and individual)

(b) Pharmaceutical Stock Points

(c) CBR Training Shortfalls

(d) CBR Training Personnel Reporting

(e) Equipment Casualty

(f) OPREP Reporting

b. Inchop Feeder Report

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- (1) All information required for Inchop Report (above)
- (2) ERT status (personnel and equipment)
- (3) DPO/SDPO/DPOTS designated personnel by name
- (4) CBR equipment inventory (to be maintained by DPO)

2. Additional CMPF reports will be required in various situations. These reports are for internal distribution, however, their contents may be used in OPREPs, After Action Reports and other external messages. Reports include:

a. Change in readiness posture / MOPP Level / THREATCON

- (1) Voice report
- (2) CMPF receives an order to increase or decrease readiness levels.
- (3) CMPF decides based on I&W to increase readiness level over CINC directed level.
- (4) CMPF promulgates order via DPO to set a new readiness level/posture.
- (5) Individual sites make voice report to CMPF via DPO immediately once posture is set.
- (6) Individual sites may not stand down from a set posture unless directed to do so by CMPF/DPO.

b. Site After Action Report. Once a CHEM/BIO attack has occurred or is believed to have occurred, this report is made.

- (1) Voice report to DPO by quickest means.
- (2) Drafted by site watch officer or ERT as situation dictates.
- (3) Initial report is made immediately after any incident with whatever information is available; amplifying data will be provided when available.

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(4) Includes:

- (a) Site location
- (b) Personnel / equipment affected
- (c) Area contaminated
- (d) Stay time
- (e) Actions taken
- (f) Estimated time of decontamination (ETD)
- (g) Extent of casualties:
 - Minor injury
 - Serious injury
 - Death
- (h) Evacuation recommendation
- (i) Emergency destruct procedures in place

COMPHIBGRUTHREEINST 3401.1

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INCHOP REPORT

FROM: UNIT
TO: COMPHIBGRU THREE
INFO: ADMINISTRATIVE/OPERATIONAL CHAIN OF COMMAND AS
APPROPRIATE
SECRET
SUBJ/ CBR-D READINESS REPORT (U) //
POC/(DPO) //
REF/A/MSG/C5F/241235ZJAN99/241245ZJAN99//
AMPN/REF A IS COMFIFTH FLEET OPTASK CHEM-BIO DEFENSE (PARTS I
AND 2) //
RMKS/1.(S) PER REF A, FOL INFORMATION PROVIDED.
A. POC:
B. EMERGENCY - ESSENTIAL CIVILIAN PERSONNEL
EMERGENCY NON-ESSENTIAL CIVILIAN PERSONNEL
C. READINESS SUMMARY: (NARRATIVE) INCLUDE: EQUIPMENT, LEVEL OF
TRAINING, CBR-D CAPABILITY.
D. IPE SHORTFALLS
E. ORGANIZATIONAL CBR-D EQUIPMENT SHORTFALLS
F. PHARMACEUTICAL STOCK POINTS
G. TRAINING SHORTFALLS (INDIVIDUAL AND UNIT) //

DECL/X4//

CLASSIFICATION SHOWN FOR ILLUSTRATION PURPOSES ONLY

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INCHOP FEEDER REPORT

FROM: (SUBORDINATE ELEMENT)
TO: COMPHIBGRU THREE//N3/N4/N5//
INFO: AS APPROPRIATE
SECRET (WHEN FILLED IN)
SUBJ/ CBR-D READINESS REPORT FEEDER (U)
POC/
REF/A/MSG/C5F/241235ZJAN99/241245ZJAN99H (IF IN 5 ' TH FLT AOR)
AMPN/REF A IS COMFIFTHFLT OPTASK CHEM-BIO DEFENSE PARTS I AND
2.//
RMKS/1. FOR INPUT INTO REPORT REQUIRED REF A, FOL INFORMATION
PROVIDED:
A. POC:
B. EMERGENCY-ESSENTIAL CIVILIAN PERSONNEL
EMERGENCY NON-ESSENTIAL CIVILIAN PERSONNEL
C. READINESS SUMMARY: (NARRATIVE) INCLUDE: EQUIPMENT, LEVEL OF
TRAINING, CBR-D CAPABILITY.
D. IPE SHORTFALLS
E. ORGANIZATIONAL CBR-D EQUIPMENT SHORTFALLS
F. PHARMACEUTICAL STOCK POINTS
G. TRAINING SHORTFALLS (INDIVIDUAL AND UNIT)H
H. ERT STATUS (PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT)
1. DPO/SPDO/DPOTS (DESIGNATED PERSONNEL BY NAME)
J. CBR EQUIPMENT INVENTORY (TO BE MAINTAINED BY DPO)

DECL/X4//

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SITE AFTER ACTION REPORT

DPO THIS IS _____
SITE

REPORTING CBR ATTACK AS FOLLOWS:

1. (LOCATION)
2. (TYPE OF AGENT)
3. (#PERSONNEL AFFECTED)
4. (EQUIPMENT AFFECTED)
5. (AREA CONTAMINATED)
6. (STAY TIME)
7. EXTENT OF CASUALTIES:
 - a. # MINOR INJURY
 - b. # SERIOUS INJURY
 - c. # DEATHS
8. (EVACUATION RECOMMENDATION, IF ANY)
9. EMERGENCY DESTRUCT PROCEDURES ARE/ARE NOT IN EFFECT

COMPHIBGRUTHREEINST 3401.1

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CHANGE IN READINESS POSTURE MOPP LEVEL/ MOPP LEVEL/ THREATCON

VOICE REPORT:

DPO:

ALL SITES IN CMPF SET MOPP LEVEL: 1 2 3 4

THREATCON: A B C

(REPEAT TWICE)

ALL SITES MAKE READY REPORTS TO DPO.

SITE WATCH OFFICER:

MOPP LEVEL: 1 2 3 4 SET

THREATCON: A B C SET

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ALARM NOTIFICATION SYSTEM

1. Purpose. To prescribe signals which give emergency alarm of an CBR hazard or attack for shore-based elements.

2. General

a. The following alarm signals will be used to alert personnel of CBR conditions.

<u>SITUATION</u>	<u>VISUAL</u>	<u>AUDIBLE</u>	<u>INDIVIDUAL</u>	<u>MOPP</u>
<u>Attack</u>	<u>ALARM SIGNALS</u>	<u>ALARM SIGNALS</u>	<u>ACTIONS</u>	<u>LEVEL</u>
Possible	<u>YELLOW FLAG</u>	A. Sounding siren horn for 10 seconds, wait 20 seconds, repeat for 3-5 minutes. B. Vocal: "ALARM YELLOW"	Assume appropriate MOPP level. Non- essential personnel (as directed by the commander) report to shelters.	2
Attack Imminent	<u>RED FLAG</u>	A. Sounding siren horn for 1 minute, wait 10 seconds, repeat for 15 minutes B. Vocal: "ALARM RED"	Take immediate cover. After attack all non essential personnel report to or remain in shelters.	3 or 4

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ALARM NOTIFICATION SYSTEM (Continued)

<u>SITUATION</u>	<u>VISUAL</u>		<u>AUDIBLE</u>		<u>INDIVIDUAL</u>	<u>MOPP</u> <u>LEVEL</u>
	<u>ALARM SIGNALS</u>		<u>ALARM SIGNALS</u>		<u>ACTIONS</u>	
Attack in Progress	BLACK FLAG		A. Sounding siren horn for 5 minutes, wait 1 minute, repeat for 3-5 cycles. B. Vocal: "ALARM BLACK"		Essential personnel perform mission, non-essential personnel report to shelters.	4
All Clear	No FLAG		Vocal: "ALL CLEAR"		Personnel may be released from shelters and resume normal" actions.	NONE

NOTES:

1. Shelters indicate any means of collective protection.
2. Following an ALARM BLACK, if no contamination hazard is detected or present, the Command will sound ALARM YELLOW or ALARM CLEAR which allows personnel to unmask.